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ABSTRACT
Applied economists often wish to measure the effects of managerial decisions or policy
changes on plant-level productivity patterns. But plant-level data on physical quantities of output,
capital, and intermediate inputs are usually unavailable. Therefore, when constructing productivity
measures, most analysts proxy these variables with real sales revenues, depreciated capital spending,
and real input expenditures. The first part of this paper argues that the resultant productivity indices
have little to do with technical efficiency, product quality, or contributions to social welfare.
Nonetheless, they are likely to be correlated with policy shocks and managerial decisions in
misleading ways.
The second part of the paper develops an alternative approach to inference. Using Steven
Berry's (1994, RAND Journal) representation of equilibrium in a differentiated product market, we
show how to impute each plant's unobserved marginal costs and product quality from its observed
revenues and costs, and how to use this mapping to calculate plant-specific welfare-based
performance measures. (Bayesian estimation techniques are required because the vector of unknown
parameters is under-identified.) The final part of the paper demonstrates our methodology using
panel data on Colombian pulp and paper plants.
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  Economists often seek to quantify the effects of a policy or event on the 
performance of the manufacturing sector. Recurrent questions include: How much, if at 
all, does trade liberalization improve efficiency? Do multinational investments cause 
firms to perform significantly better? How big are the efficiency gains from R&D 
spending? Are there learning spillovers between firms within an industry?  How do entry 
regulations affect an industry’s performance?  
  To address these issues, many analysts rely on plant- or firm-level productivity 
analysis. They posit that each establishment’s output is a function of the inputs it employs 
and its productivity level, hereafter indexed by φ. Then, using the available output and 
input measures, they estimate this function and solve for producer- and time-specific 
approximations to φ, hereafter,φ
~
. Finally, looking across producers and/or though time, 
they correlateφ
~
 with things like the extent of foreign ownership, intensity of R&D 
activity, whether the firms are exporting, rates of effective protection for the firm’s 
product, and whether entry and exit are institutionally constrained.
  
When output and input characteristics are common across plants, and when data 
on the physical quantities of these variables are available, the use of φ
~
-type measures 
makes good sense. Indeed, most of the methodological literature on this approach to 
analyzing firm or plant-level performance presumes that these conditions hold.
1 But in 
practice,φ
~
-type measures are more commonly applied to differentiated product and/or 
differentiated input industries, where the characteristics of products and factor inputs vary 
                                                 
1 Particular attention has been devoted to the issues of how to estimate the functional relationship and how 
to separate noise from “true” productivity shocks in jt φ . 
  1considerably across producers.
2 Under these circumstances data on physical volumes are 
usually unavailable, so analysts are forced to make do with information on the values of 
production, material inputs, and capital stocks.
3  The resulting performance measures are 
therefore, roughly speaking, indices of revenue per unit input expenditure.  
Such measures are viewed as a practical solution to the problem of imperfect data, 
and because they are expressed in relative value terms, they are commonly presumed to 
avoid the problem of comparing heterogeneous goods and factors. Our first objective in 
this paper is to argue that this benign view is misguided, and that standard performance 
measures can be very misleading when applied to differentiated product industries 
(Section II).  Even if the functional relationship between inputs and outputs is precisely 
estimated, they are contaminated by variation in factor prices and demand elasticities. At 
worst, they have nothing to do with firms’ productive efficiency, product quality or 
contribution to consumer surplus.  
Our second objective is to develop an alternative approach to inference (Section 
III). Specifically, we view firms’ costs and revenues as resulting from a Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium in a differentiated product industry, as in Berry (1994), and we incorporate 
the demand system explicitly in the analysis. This allows us to impute the quantities, 
qualities, marginal costs, and prices of each good from the observed revenues and 
                                                 
2 A complete list of the relevant studies would take pages. Recent examples include Olley and Pakes 
(1996), Bahk and Gort (1993), Caves and Barton (1990), Griliches (1986); Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Tybout et al (1991); Tybout and Westbrook (1995); Pavcnik (2002); Levinsohn and Petrin (forthcoming), 
and Aw, Chen and Roberts (2000). Tybout (2000) surveys this type of study for developing countries; 
Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) survey firm level studies that relate R&D to productivity measures. 
3 On the input side, the typical data set reports the value of intermediate goods purchased, the historical cost 
of capital stocks, energy usage (sometimes in kilowatt hours, sometimes in value terms), and the number of 
workers or total hours worked, perhaps broken down by broad skill categories or gender. On the output side 
it describes sales revenuesometimes distinguishing exportsand product classification according to 
standard industrial codes. 
  2expenditures. It also allows us to construct product-specific measures of consumer and 
producer surplus, and to relate these measures to policies, events, or managerial 
decisions. 
Our last objective is to demonstrate our methodology on plant-level panel data 
from the Colombian manufacturing sector, and to compare our performance measures 
with standard measures (Section IV). We find, first, that standard performance measures 
are positively correlated with producer surplus because they depend positively upon 
mark-ups. (This is probably the reason that they are correlated with producers’ survival 
rates and growth rates.) Second, these standard measures are not closely related to 
product quality measures and they are nearly orthogonal to consumer surplus measures, 
so from a social welfare standpoint, they are poor characterizations of producer 
performance. Third, firms with high marginal costs also tend to produce high quality 
products, so studies that presume homogenous products and view marginal production 
costs as an inverse index of performance tend to under-appreciate the producers of these 
goods. Finally, relating firms’ performances to whether they engage in international 
trade, we find that standard measures imply trading firms tend to do worse, while our 
welfare-based measures suggest they do not. 
 
II.  The Problem with standard performance measures 
To be specific about the features of  jt φ
~
-type indices, let us assume that the 
production function may be written as:  
( ) jt jt F h e Q jt ⋅ =
φ ,         ( 1 )  
  3where Q is the output of the j jt
th plant in period t,  jt φ  is its “true” productivity level,  ) (⋅ h  
is a differentiable function, and is a scalar index of factor usage. Also, let be a 
constant returns function of the vector of inputs employed by the plant,  , 
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 as distinct inputs.  
(V jt
r
 collapses to a scalar in the case of labor productivity studies.) 
When   and  are observable and the function  jt Q jt F ) (⋅ h is known, the productivity 
index is retrievable as  ( ) jt jt F h Q ln ln jt − = φ . But these conditions rarely prevail, so 
analysts usually proceed with imperfect information. Specifically, when data on physical 
output volumes are unavailable, they typically replace   with  jt Q t jt jt P R /
~
= Q , 
where is the j jt R
th plant’s nominal sales revenue and t P  is an industry-wide output price 
index. Similarly, if input quantities are unobservable, the convention is to replace them 














= , where  t B  is a sector-
wide input price deflator and   is the price of a unit bundle of inputs for the j jt B
th plant.
4 
Thus performance is commonly measured by indices of the general form:   
( ) ( ) jt t jt jt F h P R
~ ˆ ln ln ln
~
− − = φ ,       ( 2 )  
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jt jt W W W K
v
=  is the plant-specific vector of unit 
factor prices associated with the input vector Vjt
v
.  If some elements of the input vector are measured in 
physical terms and others are measured in expenditure terms, the expression for  jt F
~ is more complicated. 
We will treat this case in detail below. 
  4 
where  is an approximation to the function  ) ( ˆ ⋅ h ) (⋅ h . 
Sales revenues depend upon demand conditions and the nature of competition, so 
we cannot describe the properties of  jt φ
~
without introducing additional assumptions 
about consumer and producer behavior. Suppose firms compete in the industry of 
interest during period t and let demand for the j
t N
th firm’s product be given by the 
differentiable function: 
  ( ) t t t
j
jt Y P m Q , ,ω =
v v
,   { } t N j , , 1L ∈     (3) 
where   is a vector of product quality/appeal measures for all N { ′ = t N t t t t ω ω ω ω , , , 2 1 K v







firms,  is the corresponding vector of product prices, and Y  is an 
index of total market size.
t
5 Further, assume that current prices and product quality indices 
are common knowledge,   and φ
v
 do not respond to the current or past output decisions 
of any producer, firms are price takers in factor markets, and they are pure Bertrand-Nash 
price setters in the product market.  
                                                 
5 Define ) m  to be the inverse demand function for the j 
th firm, given the vector of prices for 
all other products, 
( Y P P j
j
j , , |
1
ω − − v v
j P− v
, the complete vector of product qualities, and market size. Caplin and Nalebuff 
(1991) show that a pure Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists if this function is convex and diminishing in  , 
so long as cost functions are convex. They also describe sufficient conditions on individual utility functions 
and the distribution of these utility functions across individuals for this property to obtain, and they 
demonstrate conditions for uniqueness. In particular, they show that the individual utility functions that 
underlie logit demand systems satisfy existence and uniqueness conditions. This type of demand system 
underlies our empirical work in the following sections. 
j P
  5Under these assumptions, producer j considers its marginal revenue product at input 





























 is this firm’s elasticity 







= γ  is its returns to scale. Thus, equating the marginal 
revenue product of input bundles to their unit prices, producer by producer, we obtain a set 




























,     { } t N j , , 1L ∈ .    (4) 
Finally, substituting (4) into (2),  jt φ
~
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+ − = φ ln ln
1
ln
~ ˆ ln ln
~
.    (5) 
 
  How well does  jt φ
~
capture performance? Changes in product quality or productive 
efficiency generally cause firms to adjust their size, so all of the terms on the right-hand 








ln  depend upon  jt ω and  jt φ . But as we shall argue below, jt φ
~
 
need not respond to variation in  jt ω and  jt φ  in the way that is commonly presumed; that 
is, by taking on relatively high values when  jt ω and/or  jt φ are relatively large. 
A simple case 
To simplify our discussion of  jt φ
~
, we shall assume that analysts are somehow 
able to correctly estimate the production function h(·) and the input aggregating function 
  6) (⋅ f . 
6 
 
 Further, in order to begin with a simple case, we shall momentarily suppose that 
factor usage can be precisely measured in physical terms )
~
( jt jt F F = , all firms face the 
same demand elasticity ( t j jt , ∀ η = η ), and all firms enjoy constant returns to scale  





















Under these assumptions,   drops out of equation 5 and  ) ( ˆ ln jt F h −
 becomes a constant. So  becomes proportional to real factor costs, and 
completely unrelated to productive efficiency or product quality. The former property 
obtains because firms burdened with high factor costs pass a fraction of them on to 
consumers as higher output prices, and therefore generate more revenue per unit input. 
The latter property obtains because, with η and γ parametrically fixed, shocks to φ and 
 move   and   in equal proportion, leaving revenue per unit input unaffected 
(equation 4).
jt
7 (Klette and Raknerud, 2001, and Bernard et al, 2000, make similar 
observations in slightly different contexts.) 
This dependence of  on factor prices may subvert productivity analysis in a 
number of ways. For example, the common finding that small and new firms are 
relatively unproductive may partly reflect the fact that they pay relatively low wages and 
                                                
6 Estimation errors introduce another type of problem with φ
~
-type measures, but they do not undo the ones 
we will focus upon here.  Klette and Griliches (1996) provide discuss the estimation issues that arise when 
revenue-based output measures are used in place of volume indices. 
7 Shocks to efficiency and/or product quality can, however, affect the general level of φ
~
 values if they 
affect the output price index,  t P . 
  7provide few fringe benefits (Baily, et al 1992; Griliches and Ragev, 1996; Aw, Chen and 
Roberts, 2001). Similarly, productivity among exporters may tend to be understated if 
they enjoy duty drawback schemes that reduce the costs of their intermediate inputs. On 
the other hand, the finding that geographically clustered firms are relatively productive 
(Henderson, 2001), which is typically attributed to agglomeration economies, may simply 
reflect high wages and rental costs in urban areas. Likewise, the common tendency to 
find highφ
~
 indices among R&D-intensive firms (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991) and 
among multinational firms (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Aitken and Harrison, 1999) 
may trace partly to their high unit labor costs.
8   
Similar problems arise in time series. For example, in open economies, real 
exchange rate appreciation tends to drive up real wages in the tradeable goods industries. 
But it also tends to increase import penetration rates, soφ
~
-type indices may falsely create 
the impression that import competition improves productivity among tradeable goods 
producers. Further, given that multinationals and exporters rely more intensively on 
imported intermediate goods (Kraay, et al, 2001), φ
~
-type indices may falsely imply that 
they are relatively efficient during periods of real appreciation and heightened import 
competition. (We will return to this effect in section IV.D below.) 
Unobserved heterogeneity in factor stocks 
Thus far we have been assuming that each factor is homogeneous across plants, 
and we have been treating inputs with different characteristicsfor example, different 
                                                 
8 Here we are assuming that their productivity measure is constructed using an index of physical labor 
rather than a measure of expenditures on labor. We will consider the case of expenditure-based labor 
measures shortly. 
  8types of workersas distinct elements of the V vector. Data are never actually available 
in sufficient detail to do this, so it is natural to ask how the properties of φ
~
 are affected 
by unobserved factor heterogeneity. The answer is that cross-plant and inter-temporal 
variation in factor prices will no longer be orthogonal to  jt φ and  jt ω . Rather, assuming 
that factors are paid the value of their marginal product, one would expect to find positive 
correlation between  jt φ
~
 and φ or  jt jt ω .
9 But this source of variation in  jt φ
~
 would 
simply reflect the fact that firms using high quality inputs get more and/or better output. 
It would reveal nothing about which firms are doing well in an economic sense, or 
whether firms are getting better over time.  
Endogenous demand elasticities 
Although the assumption of common demand elasticities is often invoked, it is 
unrealistic in many contexts. When some firms enjoy non-trivial market shares, formal 
characterizations of market equilibrium often imply that the larger firms face relatively 
low demand elasticities.
 10  Further, it is reasonable to expect that firms with high 
efficiency (φ ) and/or high quality products ( jt jt ω ) will use relatively large bundles of 
                                                 
9 This dependence of measured productivity on unobservable aspects of factor quality is well known (e.g., 
Griliches and Jorgenson, 1967). 
10 An inverse relationship between  or  jt ω jt φ  and the perceived elasticity of demand arises in a variety of 
contexts. For example, in a Dixit-Stiglitz (CES) system, one can induce such a relationship by assuming N 
is small. The nested logit demand system we adopt in sections III and IV also exhibits this property. 
 
  9factor inputs.
11  Thus “good” (highφ and high ω) firms may well enjoy relatively low 
demand elasticities and, accordingly, have relatively largeφ
~
’s.  To the extent that this 
linkage matters, φ
~
 variation will not be entirely unrelated to performance. 
φ
However, elasticity effects are also likely to induce spurious variation in φ
~
. For 
example, producers of close substitutes may look relatively inefficient because their 
demand is relatively elastic. Also, reductions in institutional barriers to entry may reduce 
the market power of incumbent firms (e.g., Pakes and McGuire, 1994), making them 
appear less productive. Similarly, when trade liberalization and exchange rate 
appreciation reduce the equilibrium prices of the largest domestic firmswhich compete 
most directly with importsthese shocks will tend to reduce both the average  value 







competitive effect of appreciation works against the real factor price effect mentioned 
earlier, which may help explain why the literature relating trade liberalization and import 
penetration rates to  -type measures reports mixed results (Tybout, 2001).  jt
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  .  (Here  is 
industry-wide revenues.)  Substituting this expression into the first-order condition (4), one obtains a 



























































[] 0 , ln cov > ω + φ F
 

 1 , which implies 
.   
12 This dispersion effect is one interpretation for the findings of Caves and Barton (1990). 
  10Non-constant returns to scale 
Relaxing the assumption of constant returns introduces another possible source of 
co-variation between φ
~
 and  ( ,  φ ω).  However, its sign is uncertain. Suppose returns to 
scale are above unity for the smallest firms but fall with size, as one would expect in most 
industries. Then positive shocks to  jt φ or  jt ω  increase factor usage and reduce 




 will be somewhat moderated by the negative relationship between  jt γ ln  and  . So 
the scale effect is ambiguous unless returns to scale are the same at all firms sizes.
jt F
13 
Measuring some factor in expenditure terms 
Thus far we have assumed that all factors are accurately measured in physical 
terms. But this is hardly realistic. With the possible exception of primary metals and 
some food processing sectors (e.g., dairy and grain mills), data on intermediate inputs for 
manufacturing plants are almost always expressed in expenditure terms. It is even more 
rare to find physical capital measured in terms of numbers of machines of each type and 
vintage. Therefore we now explore the properties of φ
~
 when input expenditures are used 
as proxies for input usage.  
Let some subset E { I , , 1K ⊆ } of the inputs be measured in deflated expenditure 
terms, so that the measured input vectorV jt
~ v


















V  for    E i∈
                                                 
13 If there are decreasing returns to scale, expression (5) can be used to describe the limiting case of  
perfectly competitive product markets by letting ηapproach infinity. (A unique pure Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium does not exist in the limit if returns to scale are constant or increasing.)  For the CES case 
described in footnote 11, it is easy to demonstrate that as  ∞ → η ,  jt jt jt ω + φ → φ
~ . 




~ for i .  Further, let the input aggregator function be 






















































ln γ , and  jt φ
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              (6) 
All of the properties of (5) are still present in (6). But now the role of factor prices 
is more nuanced. In particular, when some factors are measured in expenditure terms, 
cross-plant variation in their prices no longer affects  jt φ
~
because these factor prices are 
excluded from the sum . On the other hand, by measuring some factors in 
expenditure terms, we introduce a new role for their deflators through the expression 
. Thus exchange rate fluctuations and other industry-wide factor price shocks 
still work their mischief temporally on performance measures, even if the price deflators 
are precisely constructed.  Notice also that the cross-sectional effect of factor price 
variation is ambiguous under non-constant returns. It depends upon whether the factor in 
question is measured in expenditure terms, whether there are increasing or decreasing 
returns, and the strength of the negative effect of factor prices on input usage (see 
footnote 11). 
  12But don’t we get sensible stories from φ
~
? 
To all of the above, one might object that φ
~
-type performance measures 
nonetheless seem to “work.” That is, many studies have found that firms with high 
jt φ
~
values are more likely to be large or grow, and they are less likely to fail (Baily, 
Hulten and Campell, 1992; Olley and Pakes, 1996; Aw, Chen and Roberts, 2001; 
Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991; Lu and Tybout, 1996; Pavcnik, 2002). Does not this finding 
imply, as the authors of these studies suggest, that high- jt φ
~
firms are more efficient 
and/or produce a relatively desirable product? It need not. Success ultimately depends 
upon profits rather than efficiency or product quality, and firms with low demand 
elasticities (i.e., large values of 
1 − η
η
) tend both to be profitable and to have high 
jt φ
~
values, even if their productive efficiency and product quality are unexceptional.  
To summarize, when analyzing differentiated product industries, it is a mistake to 
pretend that sales revenues and input expenditures measure physical outputs and inputs, 
respectively. This convention leads to spurious measures of productivity that may have 
little to do with efficiency or product quality yet tend to be correlated with policy shocks 
and managerial choices. Furthermore, even when efficiency and product quality are 
captured in some way, these performance measures do not tell us anything about firms’ 





  13III.  An Alternative Approach to Measuring Performance 
How, then, is one to infer something about plants’ performances when neither 
their physical output volumes (Q ) nor their prices (  are available? If the input 
vector (V ) is observable and demand elasticities are the same for all firms, Melitz 
(2000) suggests using the residuals from a revenue function to make inferences about 
jt ) , jt P
jt
v
jt jt ω φ +  (see footnote 11). But in most applications, important elements of the input 
vector are measured in expenditure terms, and/or it unrealistic to assume that the 
elasticity of demand is the same for large and small firms. Under these circumstances we 
propose using an alternative approach to inference. 




























1 , are observable for all plants and they reflect equilibrium in a 
differentiated product industry. Then, using the demand functions (3) and the first-order 
conditions for profit maximization (4), it may be possible to induce a unique mapping 
from ( ) t t R C T
v v
,  to ( ) t t t C Q t P
v v v v
, ,ω , , where  denotes the j jt C
th  plant’s marginal cost 
schedule in period t. Once such a mapping is established, one can use it to impute plant-
specific consumer and producer welfare measures, to study the evolution of these welfare 




                                                 
14 Without data on factor prices it is impossible to impute productivity measures,  {} Nt t t t φ φ φ φ , , , 2 1 K = ,  
from observable variables. But these are relevant for welfare only inasmuch as they influence marginal 
costs, which are identified. 
  14A.  The demand system, producer behavior, and market equilibrium 
Several conditions must be satisfied in order to implement this strategy. First, 
one’s assumptions concerning consumer and producer behavior must imply a unique set 
of equilibrium prices and quantities( ) t t Q P
v v
,  at each ( ) t t C
v v
. ω , given observable control 
variables. (Sufficient conditions are described in Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991.)  Second, 
given equilibrium output and marginal cost values, it must be possible to infer the 
associated total variable costs, TC for each firm. Thus it is generally necessary to impose 
some structure on the marginal cost function.  
These requirements rule out non-parametric approaches and some flexible 
functional forms, but it is not difficult to find a reasonable set of assumptions that suits 
our purposes. In the remainder of this paper we describe one approach to inference that 
seems to work well.  First, we assume that marginal costs at the j
th plant in year t are 
given by the scalar C , regardless of that plant’s output level. (We do, however, 
allow to evolve through time with plant-specific productivity and factor price shocks.)  





A brief review of Berry’s (1994) model will serve to introduce parameters and 
their interpretation in the present context. At time t let } , 1 , 0 { t N j K ∈  index the Nt +1 
available varieties, with j = 0 corresponding to the “outside” variety. Further, assume that 
the product varieties can be grouped into G+1 < Nt +1 nests. In our application the 
outside product will be a composite imported variety, and the remaining varieties will 
                                                 
15 A simple logit demand system would also work; we use the nested logit for added generality. 
  15map one-to-one onto the set of active domestic plants. We will also define product nests 
according to the geographic region where the plants are located. For example, nest 1 
includes the varieties of pulp and paper products manufactured in Bogota, nest 2 includes 
the varieties manufactured in Medellin or Cali, and so on. 
Next, let the consumers active in period t be indexed by l ] , 0 ( t Y ∈ . Each period, 
each consumer in the market chooses a single unit of the variety that yields her the largest 
net indirect utility, where variety j yields consumerl net utility: 
. ) 1 ( jt t g jt jt j u u l l l ε σ ς − + + =      (7) 
Here  denotes the index for the group (nest) that contains the j } , 1 { G g j L ∈
th variety, and 
jt u  is the cross-consumer mean utility delivered by good j. The last two terms on the 
right hand side of (5) are unobserved error components that capture individual taste 
differences among consumers. The first component, t g j l ς , varies across nests but not 
within them, while jt l ε  exhibits within-nest variation. Thus the parameter  1 0 < ≤σ  
indexes the degree of substitutability among, versus within, the nests.
16  Finally, ε is 
distributed type-1 extreme value across consumers, given j and t, and [ ] ) 1 ( ε σ ς − +  is 
distributed type-1 extreme value across consumers, given t. This implicitly defines the 
distributionς , which is itself a function of σ  (Cardell, 1997). 
The mean utility delivered by domestic good j in period t depends on both its 
quality and price: 
                                                 
16 As σ goes to zero, within-group correlation of utilities goes to zero, and asσ  goes to unity, within-group 
correlation goes to unity. A more general specification lets σ  vary across groups, allowing richer 
substitution patterns (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). This specification has  important 
advantages, but it requires that we observe information about the distinctive features of each group, which 
makes it infeasible for the present application.  
  16   , ,..., 1 , N j P u jt d jt jt = ∀ α − ξ =      (8) 
where ξjt measures product quality, Pjt is the price, and  d α  measures the price effect on 
the mean indirect utility of a given domestic good.  Similarly, the mean indirect utility 
delivered by a unit of the composite imported good is:  
  t f t t P u 0 0 0 ⋅ α − ξ = ,       ( 9 )  
where   is the domestic currency price of a unit of imports, calculated as the product of 
the tariff-inclusive real price of imports in U.S. dollars and the real effective peso-dollar 
exchange rate.  Since the imported good is a composite, we allow 
t P0
d α  and   to differ.  f α
Integrating over consumers yields a logit-based functional form for the   
demand functions (3), with arguments Y , 
t N
t ) , ( 0
d
t t t P P P
v v
= ,  and  ) , 0 ( d
t t ω = ω
v v
, 
where { } t N t t
d
t t P P P P , , , 2 1 K
v
=  and  { } ot t t ξ − N t
d
t ξ ω = , K ot t ot ξ ξ ξ − − , , 2 ξ1
v  (see appendix 1). 
Note that all domestic product qualities are measured relative to the quality of the 
imported good. Also, as Berry (1994) demonstrates, under the assumption of pure 
Bertrand-Nash pricing and flat marginal cost schedules, these demand functions imply a 
specific functional form for the   profit maximizing conditions (4) (see appendix 1). 
Finally, the expressions:  
t N
 
jt jt jt Q P R ⋅ =    { } t N j , , 1L ∈      ( 1 0 )  
jt jt jt C Q TC ⋅ =   { } t N j , , 1L ∈      ( 1 1 )    
 
provide additional restrictions. t N 2
17  
                                                 
17 More generally, one might assume that the cost function is common across plants up to a single unknown 
parameter that captures idiosyncratic efficiency and/or factor price effects. 





) are available. Then the demand functions (3), the profit maximization 
conditions (4), the revenue expression (10) and the total variable cost expression (11) 
provide    equations with which to identify the  t N ⋅ 4 t N ⋅ 4  unknowns, ( ) t t
d
t P Q d
t C d v v v v
, ,ω , . 
Similarly, if total market size (Y  =   ) is unobserved but the quantity of imports 


















v v v v
, ω , , . Appendix 
1 proves that a unique solution exists for the case of a nested logit and sketches an 
algorithm for finding it. 
 
B.  The evolution of product quality and marginal costs  
It remains to link product quality and market costs to the business environment 
and managerial decisions. To this end we assume that product quality and the log of 
marginal costs evolve over time according to a vector autoregressive (VAR) process, 
conditioned on a vector   of weakly exogenous variables, including things like R&D 
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  18Accordingly, once the complete vector of parameters has been estimated, it will be 
possible to trace the welfare effects of any deviation from observed   trajectories. We 
shall assume that the errors 
jt X
( ) c ε εω,  are jointly normal and serially uncorrelated after 
controlling for plant effects. 
 
C. Estimation 
Without the VAR system described above, the demand parameters 
are not identified. A different mapping from  ) , , ( σ α α f d ( ) t t R C T
v v
,  to ( ) t t t t C Q P
v v v v
, , , ω  
exists for each feasible set of  ) , , ( σ α α f d
t t C
 values, and without more structure, each is 
equally likely. Equations (12a) and (12b) help with identification by constraining the 
shapes of the cross-sectional (
v v
, ω ) distributions and the way that individual ( ) 
pairs evolve through time. However, these constraints bear only obliquely on the demand 
parameters, and they introduce some new unknowns to be estimated. Prospects for 
successful maximum likelihood estimation are further dimmed by the irregular shape of 
the likelihood function for the nested logit (Lahiri andf Gao, 2001). Therefore we impose 
further structure by specifying priors on the unknown parameters and estimating the 
system (3), (4), (10), (11), (12) using Bayesian techniques. 
jt C jt, ω
  To summarize this estimation strategy, let us collect all of the parameters we have 
introduced in the vector  ] , , , , , [ Σ ϕ λ σ α α = f d θ , where Σ , and define 



























) (θ p to describe our priors, which we will discuss shortly. Also, let us 
collect all of the observable data on revenues, costs, imports, the exchange rate, and 
  19weakly exogenous firm characteristics in the matrix D. Then the posterior distribution for 
 is:  θ
∫
θ
θ θ ⋅ θ
θ ⋅ θ
= θ
d D L p
D L p
D
) | ( ) (
) | ( ) (
) | ( π ) | ( ) ( θ ⋅ θ ∝ D L p , where  ) | ( θ D L  is the likelihood 
function based on (3), (4), (10), (11), and (12).   
() ( ) ( ) ( ) Σ ⋅ ⋅ γ α ⋅ σ = θ σ p p Σ p ϕ γ α p p , , ,
) (θ p
] 1 ,
( ) ( ) L L N 2 2 , 0 , p , = λ ϕ λ ϕ
                                                
  Excepting elements of the covariance matrix, Σ , we have no reason to expect that 
the parameters of our model are correlated. Thus we write the joint prior distribution as a 
product of our prior marginal densities for the individual parameters:  
 
( ) λ ϕ λ , .     
 
Let us describe each component of  in turn. First, the demand system priors we 
impose are similar to those used by Poirier (1996) and Lahiri and Gao (2001).
18 The 
underlying utility maximization problem implies that  0 [ ∈ σ , so we specify uniform 
priors on this region of support.
 19 Second, we believe the price coefficients and  d α f α  
should be positive but we do not know much about their magnitudes, so we specify 
uniform priors with support [0, 10] for each of these parameters. The remaining 
parameters describe the VAR (equations 12a and 12b). For the autoregressive parameters 
we assume joint normality,  L I2 100× , where L is one plus the 
number of right-hand side variables appearing in each VAR equation. Finally, as is 
 
18 These studies also estimate nested logit models using Bayesian techniques. However,  unlike ours, they 
are concerned with the problem of ill-defined nesting structures. 
19 Restricting σ to be greater or equal to zero reflects our prior knowledge that the products within each 
nest are at least as good substitutes for each other as those products outside the nest.  Values ofσ greater 
than one are not consistent with the underlying assumption of the extreme value distribution of consumer 
tastes.  As σ goes to unity, consumers would purchase only the goods with the highest mean indirect utility 
in each nest.  Restricting σ to be less than or equal to one ensures that all products get consumed.   
  20standard in the literature, for the covariance matrix we assume an inverted-Wishart 
distribution,  ( 2 100 , 6 ) ( I InvWish p ) × = Σ Σ . Overall then, with the exception of  , we are 
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Closed-form representations of the posterior  ) | ( D θ π are not available; nor is it 
feasible to make i.i.d. draws directly from  ) | ( D θ π . We therefore use a Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to generate correlated draws from  ) | ( D θ π  and we 
analyze the moments of the resulting empirical distributions (Gilks, et al, 1996).  
The vector   is relatively large, so we exploit Gibbs sampling techniques to 
generate our Markov chain. That is, we partition θ into three sub-vectors: 
, where  2 1 , , θ θ = θ θ ,  ) 2 , ( ϕ λ = θ and  Σ θ3 . Then we update the 
sub-vectors sequentially by drawing from the full conditional distributions of each in 
turn. The full conditional distribution of ( 2|  1 θ ,  3 θ , D) is multivariate normal because D 
and θ  imply the   trajectories, which contain all of the available information on 
. For the same reason, the full conditional distribution of (
1
2 θ θ | 1 θ ,  2 θ , D) is inverted-
Wishart. Thus closed-form expressions for the full conditional distributions of θ  and  3 θ  
are easy to construct, and sampling from these distributions is straightforward (Zellner, 
1971). However, no simple expression for the full conditional distribution of ( | θ ,  1 θ 2 3 θ , 
D) is available, so we use a Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm. Appendix 2 
provides further details. 
E.  Constructing Performance Measures 
Once we have estimated our posterior distribution,  ) | ( D θ π , we solve for the 
marginal cost and product quality trajectories of each producer in the sample using the 
  21expected value of  . θ
20   The remaining task is then to translate these trajectories into 
meaningful performance measures, and to examine the relationship between those 







th producer, we calculate the increment to consumer surplus that it 
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Prices and market shares are allowed to adjust to re-establish equilibrium when good m is 
removed. Similarly, we calculate the i
th producer’s own surplus as ( ) it it it Q C P −
)
, and 
from this we subtract the negative externality this producer imposes on the surplus of 






jt jt jt Q C P
th producer present, letting prices and market shares adjust to re-establish 
equilibrium.   
To evaluate these firm-specific welfare contributions, we express them as ratios to 
firms’ reported capital stock to obtain a crude social rate of return on investment. (All 
other costs of operation are captured by variable costs and will already be netted out of 
producer surplus.) Obviously we miss pre- and post-sample costs and benefits and our 
                                                 
20 It would, of course, be possible to also study the distributions for these trajectories that are induced by 
; we have not pursued this yet.  ) | ( D θ π
21 Ackerberg and Rysman (2001) argue that the nested logit demand system overstates the contribution to 
consumer surplus provided by each product because it implies very high marginal utility from the first units 
consumed of each good. Thus our results may over-emphasize consumer surplus relative to producer 
surplus. 
  22measure of firms’ assets will be very crude, but we feel we will come closer to a 
comprehensive basis for assessment than the standard methodologies. For the sake of 
comparison, we also calculate the usual Tornqvist measures of total factor productivity 
under the standard assumptions that deflated revenues measure real output, and deflated 
expenditures on intermediate goods measure physical intermediate good usage:  
)
~








jt t jt jt V P R ∑
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where   is the share of the i
i
jt µ ˆ
th factor in total costs at firm j during period t.  
 
IV.  An Application to the Colombian Pulp and Paper Mill Industry 
A.    The Data 
We base our empirical example on panel data describing the Colombian pulp and 
paper mill industry over the period 1981-1991. These data were originally collected by 
Colombia’s official statistical agency (Departmento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadistica) and have been cleaned as described in Roberts (1996). To keep the analysis 
simple we exclude plants that entered or exited during the sample period, leaving a total 
of 13 plants over an 11 year period.
22 This naturally creates some selection bias, although 
the entering and exiting plants were quite small and thus had a minor influence on market 
shares. 
We construct total domestic sales, , as total sales revenue less the value of 
exports divided by a general wholesale price deflator. To construct total variable costs, 
, we first sum payments to labor, intermediate input purchases net of inventory 
jt R
jt TC
  23accumulation, and energy purchases. Then we scale this aggregate by the ratio of total 
domestic sales to total sales and we divide the result by the same wholesale price deflator 
we used for output. This definition of total variable cost implies, of course, that 
expenditures on physical capital are fixed costs.
 23  
Our real exchange rate series, e , is taken from Ocampo and Villar (1995), who 
include an adjustment for tariffs. To impute imports we assume that all imported goods in 
the relevant industrial classification maintain their same exogenous dollar price during 
the sample period. Further, we assume that the imported varieties are consumed in fixed 
proportion to one another, so that they can be treated as a single bundle whose domestic  
price fluctuates only with the exchange rate. Then, calling the period t dollar value of 










0 = . The units in 
which Q  is measured determine the units in which all domestic varieties are measured 
and effectively fix the size of the market.
t 0
24 
Finally, the vector of weakly exogenous variables ( ) includes the book value 
of each plant’s initial (1981) capital stock, a trend term, and two dummy variables that 
jt X
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Entry and exit would complicate the VAR portion of the likelihood function by creating an unbalanced 
panel. 
23 An equally simple approach would be to assume that capital stocks are perfectly flexible, and to include a 
rental cost of capitalsay 10 percent of the book valuein our total cost measure. The intermediate case 
in which capital stocks (and perhaps other inputs) are subject to finite adjustment costs is difficult to deal 
with because it means introducing dynamic optimization into the analysis. 
24Unfortunately, the choice of the units of Q  also has implications concerning import volume shares. If we 
were to halve the imputed quantity of imports, the imputed volume share of imports would also be smaller. 
This reflects the fact that domestic quantities are not linear in Q . An increase in Q does imply bigger 
domestic quantities but the increase is less than proportional. In practice, we normalize the series of real 
exchange rate so that in the base year revenue share of imports equals its volume share. 
0
0 0
  24summarize plants’ participation in foreign markets. The first takes a value of one if the 
plant was importing some or all of its intermediate inputs in year t-1, but not exporting 
any of its output. The second dummy takes a value of one if the plant was both importing 
some intermediates and exporting some output in year t-1. No plant in our sample 
exported output without importing intermediate inputs, so the omitted category is simply 
plants that did not buy inputs or sell outputs in international markets in year t-1.
25  
 
B.  Posterior Parameter Distributions  
Means, standard errors and other summary statistics for our estimated  posterior 
distribution   are reported in Table 1 below. The estimates are constructed using 
Wooldrich’s (2001) correction for persistent unobserved heterogeneity in the disturbance 
term.
) | ( D θ π
26 
Overall, the results appear quite well behaved, although the posterior distribution 
for the price coefficient α  is rather diffuse. d
27 Given the small sample size we are 
working with, this is perhaps unsurprising. The mixing parameter σtends to be close to 
unity, suggesting that most of the variation in tastes across consumers has to do with 
region of origin. The VARs for product quality and marginal cost both show a plausible 
                                                 
25 It would have been desirable to also include R&D spending, and to distinguish firms according to 
whether they were partly owned by foreigners. Unfortunately, this information was not available. 
26 Wooldrich’s (2001)  correction takes care of initial conditions problem. It amounts to including the initial 
value of the lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables in all years, and using a standard error 
components specification for the disturbance. Kraay et al (2001) provide further discussion in the context 
of a similar VAR. Our results indicate that the variance of the random effect is sufficiently small to ignore, 
so we simply include initial values of the lagged dependent variables. 
27 The standard errors can be misleading because these are not symmetrically distributed random variables. 
For example, although a standard t-test would not reject the null hypothesis that α=0, with 90 percent 
confidence, the 90 percent confidence intervals for σ lie entirely in the positive domain. 
  25amount of persistence. On the other hand, there is less dynamic interaction among these 
variables than we expected. (That is, we thought high marginal cost in one year might 
lead to higher product quality in the next year.) Nonetheless, as we will see shortly, these 
variables do exhibit contemporaneous covariance across plants because of persistent plant 
effects. Finally, our coefficients for trends, international transactions, and capital stocks 
are not estimated with much accuracy. However, the impact of importing intermediate 
goods on marginal costs and product quality is large and negative, on average. We will 
return to explore the implications of these international transactions coefficients in 
section D below. 
 
C.  Plant performance measures 
  Using the posterior means of our demand parameters, we impute relative product 






























Π + ∆ j +  . Then pooling all 11 years of observations on the 13 plants in 
continuous operation, we obtain the descriptive statistics in table 2. The results imply that 
the ratio of operating profits to fixed capital is roughly 7 percent, so the average rate of 
return on fixed capital investment is quite sensible. Domestic products are, on average, 
  26somewhat more attractive than the imported goods, but the cross-product standard 
deviation in relative appeal is substantial. (Robustness tests, not reported, show that it 
also depends on our   specification.) Most social surplus comes from the consumer 
side rather than the producer side (but see footnote 21). Indeed, the only reason that 
plants make a positive contribution to welfare is that this consumer surplus effect 
dominates the negative externality each plant imposes on the others by shrinking their 
market. (Some plants actually reduce net total welfarethis is a well known possibility 
in the case of monopolistic competition.)  
) (⋅ σ p
=
  We next calculated the cross-plant correlations in these variables reported in 
tables 3.
28 The implications are intriguing. First, relative product quality, ω , and the log 
of marginal production costs,  , are weakly correlated (
j
j C ln = ρ 0.201). Thus on average, 
it costs relatively more to produce a relatively desirable good, and it is probably 
inappropriate to equate low production costs with superior performance.   
  Second, the standard total factor productivity measure ( jt φ
~
) is weakly associated 
with product quality (ρ  0.238) because of the elasticity effect mentioned in sections II 
and III. So jt φ
~
 does partly capture an aspect of performance that is directly related to 
welfare (ρ  0.435).  On the other hand, = jt φ
~
 is orthogonal to marginal costs (ρ 0.022), 
which in turn reflects factor prices and technical efficiency. We cannot unbundled these 
two cost components without plant-specific information on factor prices, but if the 
=
                                                 
28 We also looked at correlations of firms’ rankings in terms of each of these variables. The results are 
nearly identical to those reported in Table 3, so we do not report them here. 
  27dominant source of variation is technical efficiency, it follows that  jt φ
~
 does a poor job of 
capturing φ .  jt
 Fourth,  jt φ
~






( 0.600). This association with own surplus appears to reflect underlying variation in 




, it dampens output and 
scales back  ( ) jt jt jt C P − jt Q = Π . 
  Finally, although producer surplus is positively associated with  jt φ
~
, the opposite 
is true of consumer surplus (ρ -0.153). Thus total surplus created over own fixed 




 ( = ρ 0.220). This correlation is the only one that 
matters if we are exclusively concerned with contributions to social welfare. Taken at 
face value, it implies that traditional Tornqvist indicesand, we suspect, the entire class 
of indices discussed in section IItell us little about which firms are do well from a 
social perspective.  
 
D.   Linking performance to policy 
  It is popular to regress performance measures like  jt φ
~
 on policy variables or plant 
characteristics that are considered to respond to policy. For example, variants of  jt φ
~
 have 
often been regressed on measures of exposure to foreign technology, including foreign 
direct investment in the firm or its industry, and indicators for whether the firm is an 
  28exporter. As a final exercise, we demonstrate an alternative exercise using the welfare-
based performance measures described in the previous section.  
  Specifically, we use the estimates in table 1 to quantify the effects of prohibiting 
firms from becoming exporters and/or importing intermediate goods. It would be 
straightforward to also prohibit consumers from importing foreign substitutes, but we will 
not do so in order to focus on these two production-side trade restrictions.  Also, for the 
same reason, we will assume that total domestic demand evolves exactly as it would have 
in the absence of our policy shock, and that each producer draws the same VAR shocks 
 that were actually observed.  ) , ( ω ε ε jt
c
jt
  Under these assumptions we can use our VAR parameters to calculate the paths 
for (  that would have emerged if, beginning in 1982, all international 
producer trade had been shut down. The cross-plant temporal averages for these variables 
are graphed in Figure 1. As one could have predicted, since the use of imported 
intermediate imports reduces marginal costs (Table 1), our hypothetical policy regime 
results in marginal cost increases. It also results in slight quality increases as firms 
substitute toward domestic sources. The latter seems counter-intuitive, but it follows from 
our finding that high quality is weakly associated with high cost. 
) ln , jt jt C ω
  Substituting our parameter estimates and these counterfactual trajectories for 
 into equations (8), (9) and (12), we next re-solve for equilibrium each 
period and calculate the new trajectories for producer and consumer surplus. These are 
graphed in figure 2. On net, not much happens to producer surplus because prices and 
costs move in the same direction. (This helps explain why some producers use imported 
inputs and others do not.) More surprisingly, not much happens to consumer surplus 
) ln , ( jt jt C ω
  29either. The reason is that the higher prices of domestic varieties due to higher marginal 
costs are accompanied by slight increases in quality, and our demand system estimates 
imply that consumers care a great deal about quality. We caution that this result appears 
to depend upon our priors. Other priors led to posterior parameter distributions (not 
reported) that implied a 10 percent loss in consumer surplus when producers were 
prohibited from foreign trade. 
  A very different story would have emerged if we had relied on  jt φ
~
-type measures 
for policy analysis. Fitting an AR(1) like those in table 1 to the Tornqvist index discussed 
earlier, we find that firms that imported their intermediate goods had significantly lower 
measured productivity.
 29 Thus cutting firms off from foreign trade would appear to 
significantly improve performance. This may reflect the fact that our sample period 
includes a major devaluation, which presumably encouraged exporting and the use of 
imported intermediate goods at the same time that it depressed  jt φ
~
 through relative price 
effects (refer to equation 6). The top panel of figure 3 presents average trajectories of the 
performance measure  jt φ
~
with, versus without, producer trade. 
  It is noteworthy that the time series average value of this φ
~
-type index tracks our 
welfare based index in figure 2 rather closely. Thus, in sense, the cross-producer variation 
in φ
~
-type measures is much more problematic than temporal variation that is typical of 
the population of plants. However, the reason for the high temporal correlation between 
                                                 




− φ jt and the same weakly exogenous variables that appear in the VAR 
specifications of table 1, making the same correction for unobserved heterogeneity. We obtained a 
coefficient of –0.163 (standard error 0.068) on our dummy for use of imported intermediates without 
exporting, and a coefficient of  -0.220 (standard error 0.071) on our dummy for use of imported 
intermediates while simultaneously exporting. 
  30mean  jt φ
~
 values and social welfare is that the market for pulp and paper products 
expands during the sample period, not that firms improved in terms of their marginal 
costs or product qualities (refer to Figure 1). 
 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
The analysis we have presented here is crude in many ways. We have used a very 
simple demand system, we have assumed that marginal costs are flat with respect to 
output, we have ignored producers that were not present for the entire sample period, and 
we have ruled out any form of forward looking behaviordue either to dynamic pricing 
games or to capital accumulation. Finally, we have paid no attention to the institutional 
and technological features of the Colombian pulp and paper industry.   
For all of these reasons, we do not wish to argue that the numbers we have 
presented here are the best that one can do. Rather, our objectives have been to argue that 
much of the literature on plant-level performance is fundamentally flawed, and to sketch 
an alternative approach to inference that we feel holds more promise. Significant 
refinements in most of the dimensions mentioned above are possible; we are optimistic 
that they will enhance the usefulness of our methodology.  
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  35Appendix 1: Inferring Qualities and Quantities from Revenues and Costs 
This appendix demonstrates that a unique mapping exists from( ) t t t t R C T Q P
v v
, , , 0 0  
to ( ) t t t t C Q P
v v v v
, , , ω  and sketches an algorithm for finding it. The mapping is done period 
by period, so we shall hereafter drop t subscripts to reduce clutter.  
First, let us replicate some well-known expressions for nested logit demand 
systems. Under the assumptions reviewed in section IIa, demand for the j
th domestic 
variety, expressed as share of total demand for varieties in the j
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Also, expressed as a share of total demand for the industry’s product, demand for the 
products in the j
th product’s nest as is: 
.
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Therefore our functional form for the j
th producer’s demand function (equation 3) is 
Y s s Y P m g g j
j ⋅ ⋅ = θ ω | ) | , , (
v v
, and profits for the j
th  producer may be written as: 
.  Further, given pure Bertrand-Nash pricing strategies, 
the standard first order conditions for profit maximization imply that equation (4) may be 
written as (Berry,1994): 
Y ⋅ S S C P
j j g g j j j j ⋅ ⋅ − = Π | ) (
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⋅ ⋅ σ − − ⋅ σ −
α σ −
+ =    N j K , 1 =        (A1.3) 
 
Our objective is to show that, given ( ) R C T Q P
v v
, , , 0 0 , the  N ⋅ 4  unknowns ( ) C Q P
v v r v
, , , ω  are 
uniquely determined by (A1.1) through (A1.3) and (10) and (11) of the text.  
First, by equation (11), total variable costs at the j
th plant are TC , so the 
within-group market share of the j
j j j C Q =








S = |  where total output from 
the j








Q  and total domestic output is 








th plant are  , 
so the j
j jQ P j R =







j j j C m P ) 1 ( + =
, and once its marginal cost is known, its price can be calculated as 
.    
Substituting these market share and price expressions into the pricing rule (A1.3) 










































.   (A1.5) 
This expression defines the unobservable C  as a monotonic decreasing function of 





Q , j j m
tot and Q .  Thus, once the nest quantity subtotals are 
  37known, each firm’s marginal costs are implied by (A1.1). With these marginal costs, 
prices can be retrieved from  j j j C m P ) 1 ( + = . In turn, these imply quantities 
, and market shares follow trivially. Finally, once prices and market shares 
are known, the vector of product qualities can be found by substituting into: 
j j j P R Q / =
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    ( )
N j
S S S S
j j j g g j g j d j
,..., 1
) ln( ln ) 0 | | 0
=
− ⋅ + α = ξ − ξ
,     (A1.6) 
 
which follows from (A1.1) and (A1.2).
 30  (Here  is the market share of 


















Substituting the marginal cost expression (A1.5) into this sum, and dividing both sides by  
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k k k m TC Q 1 1
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1
,    (A1.7) 
G g K , 1 = .       
The right-hand side of (A1.6) is a monotonic negative function of   with value 




g Q ∞ g n
                  
30 Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use a similar inversion to study the quality of automobile models. 
  38in nest g. Thus, for all  ,  , and  , equation (A1.7) has a unique, 
positive root:  , which can be found using a bisection algorithm at 
any Q .  
{} G g K , 1 ∈
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1
+ ⋅ ⋅ g Q s 1 ) σ − + σ 1 (
g
tot Q G g K , 1 =
Finally, we will show that Q  has a unique positive 
root for any given Q . The existence of at least one root follows from the fact that 
 is continuous in Q  ,    and 



































Q tot    (A1.3) 














1 ,  G g K , 1 = , which implies 
that s  falls with  ,  . Again, a bracketing and bisection algorithm suffices 
to generate numerical solutions. 
  39Appendix 2: The Gibbs Sampler 
  Because it is not feasible to sample independent draws from the density  
, we use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. The idea is to 
draw a sequence of realizations on 
) | ( D θ π
) | ( ) ( θ ⋅ θ ∝ D L p
θ from some Markov process, { } ) ( , i θ ) 2 ( ) 1 ( , ,θ θ L
) D
, 
with elements whose unconditional distributions converge to  | (θ π  as i → .  After 
discarding the early draws to eliminate the effects of the starting values, one can 
approximate the posterior moments of 
∞
θby constructing their sample counterparts from 
the chain. 
   The mostly commonly used MCMC algorithm is the Gibbs sampler. It generates  
a Markov chain by breaking the parameter vector into sub-vectors with full conditional 
distributions that can be sampled from, then using these conditional distributions to 
update the sub-vectors sequentially (Gilks, et al, 1996). We exploit Gibbs sampling 
techniques by breaking θinto 3 sub-vectors:  ( ) σ α α = θ , , 1 f d ,  ( ) φ λ = θ , 2 , and 
. These we update according to the following algorithm:   ) ( 3 Σ = θ vec






) 0 ( , , θ θ θ = θ , and i = 0. 
Step 1: Draw θ  as follows:  ) 1 ( + i





1 θ θ θ π + θ  





2 θ θ θ π θ + +       






+ + + θ θ θ π θ         
Step 2:  Set i = i + 1, and go to step 1. 
  40The distribution ( D , , | 3 2 1 1 ) θ θ θ
()
π  is the most difficult to construct. It is 
proportional to  ( ) 1 3 2 1 1 , , | θ θ θ θ p θ D L  where  ( ) 3 2 1 , , | θ θ θ D L  is the likelihood function 
based on (10)-(12) and (A1.1)-(A1.3); and  ( ) 1 1 θ θ p  is the prior distribution defined in the 
text. But   does not have a closed form expression, so we draw  ( 2 1 , , θ θ θ ) ( ) 1 3 1 θ θ f | D L 1 θ  
using the random-walk Metropolis algorithm with a normal proposal density. The 
performance of the random-walk Metropolis algorithm depends crucially on the variance 
–covariance matrix of the proposal density. If the variance-covariance matrix is too big, 
then nearly all proposed moves will be accepted (high acceptance) but the random walk 
will move around the parameter space very slowly (slow mixing). On the other hand, if 
the variance-covariance matrix is too small, then an excessively large fraction of 
proposed moves will be rejected (low acceptance), although those draws that are accepted 
will move the chain by large increments.  To balance these two effects, the convention is 
to choose the variance-covariance matrix in such a way that the empirical overall 
acceptance rate is around between 0.15 and 0.5. For more details, see Gilks, et al, (1996, 
chapter 7). We experimented until this condition was satisfied. 
To describe   and  () D , , | 3 1 2 2 θ θ θ π ( ) D , , | 2 1 3 3 θ θ θ π , let us rewrite (13a) and (13b)  
as  Y  where   jt jt jt Z ε + β′ = ( )′ ω = jt jt jt c ,, Y   ( )′ ′ ω = − − jt jt jt jt X c Z , , , 1 1 1 , 
( )
c
jt jt ε ε
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Then, we can write the VAR system asY U Z + β = . Further, conditional on  , our one-
to-one mapping from (
1 θ
t t R C T
v v
,| t t t C t P0 0 , Q )  t o  (
v v
, ω ) allows us to infer (Y, Z) from 
. Thus the construction of  ( D , 1 θ ) ( ) D , , | 3 1 2 2 θ θ θ π  and  ( ) D , , | 2 1 3 3 θ θ θ π  is a standard 
exercise (Zellner, 1971).  
 Specifically, the likelihood-based full conditional distribution of  , given 
, is normal with mean 
2 θ
( D , , 3 1 θ θ ) () ( ) ) ' ( ' ' 2
1 Y vec I Z Z Z ⋅ ⊗ −
2
and variance () . 
The full conditional posterior distribution for 
Σ ⊗ −1 'Z Z
θ  efficiently blends this information with 
our priors. We have assumed that  2 θ  has prior distribution ( ) 0 0,V u N   , so 
 is multivariate normal with mean  ( , | 1 2 2 θ θ π ) D , 3 θ ( ) [ ] 0 u 1
0 ) V − + ′ 1 Z n





and variance () ( 1 − − +V − Σ ⊗ ′Z Z = n V .   
Similarly, using the mapping( ) D , , 2 1 θ θ ( ) Z Y, , β → , we may write the likelihood-










it it it it Z Y Z Y
T N 12 ) 1 (
1
Σ
'. When multiplied by N(T-1), this estimator has a 
Wishart distribution with N(T-1) degrees of freedom. Thus, given that we have assumed 
 has prior distribution  ( )  G 1
0 0, − m InvWish , the full conditional posterior distribution for 
  42) ( 3 Σ = θ vec ,  i.e.,  , is the vector version of a  
distribution, where 
( D , , | 2 1 3 3 θ θ θ π
( 0
) ) , (
1 −
n n G m Wish   Inv
) 1 − + = T N m n m  and  () () β − ′ β Z Y Z − + = − − Y G n
1
0
1 G .  




Error  Median Skewness 5%  95% 
  Demand System 
αd (prior:  )  ] 10 , 0 [ ~ U α 4.194 2.845 3.696  0.375  0.437  9.198 
αf (prior:  )  ] 10 , 0 [ ~ U γ 1.086 0.779 0.997  0.463  0.070  2.423 
σ (prior: σ )  ] 1 , 0 [ ~ U 0.970 0.023 0.975  -1.029  0.927  0.997 
 
  Product Quality VAR 
1 λ  (constant)  -0.436 3.186 -0.229 -0.199 -5.876 4.608 
2 λ  ( )  1 − ωit 0.469 0.376  0.468  0.008  -0.152  1.086 
3 λ  ( )  1 ln − it C 0.053 0.237  0.056  -0.032  -0.343  0.437 
4 λ  (trend)  -0.021 0.046 -0.020 -0.219 -0.098 0.052 
5 λ  (initial capital stock)  -0.009 0.101 -0.007 -0.133 -0.179 0.153 
6 λ  (exported, t-1)  0.029 0.374  0.022  0.059  -0.578  0.648 
7 λ  (imported intermediates, t-1)  -0.040 0.385 -0.041  0.030  -0.679 0.595 
ω ϑ1 (ω )  1 i 0.788 1.373  0.781  0.051  -1.467  3.051 
ω ϑ2 (ln )  1 i C -0.192 0.382 -0.157 -0.511 -0.897 0.353 
  Log Marginal Cost VAR 
1 φ  (constant)  0.291 3.211  0.069  0.286  -4.684  5.896 
2 φ  ( )  1 ln − it C 0.551 0.244  0.554  -0.060  0.152  0.946 
3 φ  ( )  1 − ωit 0.314 0.383  0.311  0.020  -0.306  0.942 
4 φ  (trend)  0.001 0.045  0.001  0.080  -0.071  0.076 
5 φ  (initial capital stock)  -0.003 0.105 -0.004  0.062  -0.170 0.169 
6 φ  (exported, t-1)  -0.146 0.387 -0.145 -0.042 -0.788 0.490 
7 φ  (imported intermediates, t-1)  -0.098 0.403 -0.104  0.029  -0.764 0.557 
C
1 ϑ ( )  1 ln i C -0.799 1.382 0.255  0.435 -0.267 0.954 
c
1 ϑ (ω )  1 i 0.286 0.384 -0.788  -0.064  -3.129  1.433 
  Covariance Matrix 
11 Σ   0.943 0.127  0.931  0.532  0.755  1.168 
12 Σ   0.010 0.093  0.010  0.009  -0.143  0.164 
22 Σ   1.004 0.137  0.992  0.535  0.802  1.245 
  44TABLE 2:  
































j C ln   j ω  
 Mean  0.065 0.071 -0.221  -0.085  -3.198  1.868 
 Median  0.004 0.067 -0.156  -0.057  -3.252  1.886 
 Std. Dev.  0.134 0.041 0.222  0.147  0.496  0.279 
 Skewness  12.516 2.082  4.752  7.266  -0.208  -0.026 
 
TABLE  3:  































































     1.000  0.186  0.435  0.220 
j C ln         1.000  0.201  0.022 
j ω           1.000  0.238 
j φ
~
           1.000 
 
* All variables are purged of annual time effects. Productivity normalizations are based 
on Caves et al (1982). 
  45 FIGURE 1: 
EFFECTS OF PRODUCER TRADE ON QUALITY AND MARGINAL COST TRAJECTORIES 
 



















































































  46FIGURE 2: EFFECTS OF PRODUCER TRADE ON WELFARE MEASURES 
 
 




















































































  47FIGURE  3:  
EFFECTS OF PRODUCER TRADE ON TRADITIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
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